Types of Risks and Their Characteristics

For each type of human activity, a specific definition of risk can be derived. This definition also depends on the angle from which the risk is studied. In our case, for alpinism and tourism, the risks we will consider represent a condition that, if it occurs, has the potential to negatively impact the group. The difference here from more "classical" schemes is that we do not consider theoretical models but rather rely on practical ones. Thus, we take as an axiom that conditions capable of having a negative impact arise inevitably and on a constant basis. Firstly, many of them we create consciously and purposefully by setting certain frameworks and rules for navigating the route. Secondly, we are not capable of excluding all negative conditions because some of them arise independently of us. Thirdly, we almost never consider risks as conditions that can also have a positive impact on the group, as our research starts from accident rates rather than from accident-free conditions. In simple terms, our risks are "before something happens." When we work with risks as uncertain conditions, the event has not yet occurred. It is potential and will happen only with a certain degree of probability, high or low. Nevertheless, since we are considering the scheme of risks from a practical perspective, the probability itself in a mathematical sense is not of interest to us because it is not important. We suffer equally from an event that occurred with a "probability of 100%" and one with a "probability of 1%," if the impact of these events is the same. So, below we will structurally examine the risks that represent uncertain conditions capable of having a negative impact.

In the previous chapters, we examined the combination of processes that can lead to events on a route. We found that risks are at the root of everything. Risks represent a condition that, if it occurs, has the potential to negatively impact a group. Risks are "before the fact." When we work with risks as uncertain conditions, the event has not yet occurred. Our actions and decisions on the route are always accompanied by risks. They either generate them or, conversely, reduce the likelihood of an event by eliminating the conditions for their occurrence. In most cases, an accident is either caused or accompanied by our actions and decisions - risks. However, our actions and decisions can also prevent an accident or reduce its severity. The nuance is that the negativity of a decision or action is only known after the fact - and often the mistake is not acknowledged; good decisions and actions, on the other hand, mostly go unnoticed because the event did not occur. This contradiction affects the further application of experience. Solely positive experience does not provide an understanding of the boundaries within which decisions and actions are most effective. Nevertheless, negative experience without recognition and analysis of mistakes leads to a similar result. In this regard, the described version of negative experience is much more dangerous than solely positive experience. Thus, risks create conditions for events to occur. Risks come from both the team itself - generated risks, and from the environment - inherent risks. An event is a direct negative impact on the group. That is, when a storm tears a tent, an event occurs, resulting from an environmental factor. The death of one of the participants due to hypothermia in a torn tent is another event. A storm here represents an environmental phenomenon; it becomes an event when it transfers the system to a worse state.

In the article continuing the topic of risks, we will examine a more complex danger equation. Based on it, we will evaluate common judgments related to sporting and commercial routes. The article is more complex than the previous ones and is intended for an audience that does not find all the answers in guidelines and rules. It continues the ideology of the previous articles but provides a more detailed answer to the question of why we still get into accidents, even though we seem to be doing everything correctly and according to official guidelines. In the previous chapter, we analyzed real examples of event loops - perhaps the most terrifying phenomenon on a route, when a series of unfortunate decisions traps a group in a loop where each subsequent step leads to a depletion of resources, and after a qualitative reduction, the participants perish. In two of the three cases we analyzed, the group's experience significantly exceeded the complexity of the declared route. As harsh as it may sound, these examples divide the audience into two conditional and polar categories. The first category believes that the events of the loops were obvious from the start and that they can avoid similar situations on their routes. The other half, on the other hand, understands that we are not always able to control the situation, especially in large groups. The division I mentioned does not depend on the experience of hiking and climbing, in terms of their quantity and quality. In this article, we will examine in detail why this is the case. However, the material is intended specifically for the second category - those who want to travel safely in conditions of high uncertainty and do not indulge in illusions of control.

Simplified Risk Equation

In the second part about accidents, we dissect different groups by their route passage characteristics, resources, and ultimately by how they generate risks. In the previous chapter, we found that the generated risks have the greatest impact on the events occurring within a group. However, different groups generate risks differently, even when the same participants in different teams can create risks in completely opposite ways. Since we consider groups as a whole, as a single entity - simply because a group struggles with events as a unified organism - we will examine resources and risk generation primarily in relation to groups. Nevertheless, at certain stages, which we will inevitably explore using the example of ambitious participants and risk-loving participants, we will see that individual risk generation has a significant factor, especially if it involves: a) clients of commercial groups; b) group leaders. Let's first define the division of groups based on the outcome of the route passage.

Groups by Route Passage Outcome

Regarding the route outcome, regardless of its complexity, groups are divided into: a) those that have completed the route; b) those that have dropped out of the route without an accident; c) those that have dropped out of the route with an accident. We do not consider exceptional cases that confirm the rules. This is a very logical but "childish" division, which, however, is necessary for us to intermediate the connection between groups and risks, both inherent and generated. So, why did the first group complete the route? Because:

Before we move on to the chapter where we'll examine a more complex risk equation than the classical one, and analyze the role our experience plays in it, let's first clarify the concepts of risk addition and subtraction. Risk addition poses a specific problem that warrants separate consideration. We have inherent risks and generated risks. They can lead to events. From the chapter on risks, we've learned the following: A) Events are inevitable B) Risks always add up The fewer the sum of risks, the lower the impact of the event on us. However, the force of the event may initially exceed our capabilities. Let's start with an example: we're crossing a pass, and a rock falls on our head. It's known that many tourists have crossed passes without ever being hit by a falling rock. Nevertheless, empirical experience shows that if a tourist hikes passes of category 1B...2A and above every year for 15 years in different regions, it's almost certain that they'll be hit by something falling from above at least once. Maybe a carabiner, ice axe, or a partner's boot. Or even crampons. Very rarely - intentionally )) If someone claims it hasn't happened to them, it means they just don't remember the last time it did. For an experienced tourist, selective memory loss is normal. The same empirical experience of hiking in the same region over many years shows that there are years when everything is falling apart, even things that previously seemed reliable and stable.

1) Certification of guide instructors

Essentially, a new axis of reality for active tourism is being set. As of July 2024, this has become a mandatory framework for commercial accompaniment on complex routes; the authority for certification has been given to all-Russian sports federations, there are schedules for 2025–2026, and many regions are living in "hurry to re-certify by 01.10.2026" mode. Why is this topic hot? It changes responsibility, market, tolerances, and gives rise to a new type of generated risk - "paper competence" and "checkmarks instead of skills".

2) Avalanche literacy as a necessary base, not an elective for enthusiasts

A sore topic that has worn everyone out. Strangely, in tourism, suddenly, more attention is being paid to this than in mountaineering. In mountaineering, avalanche training is traditionally embedded in the training system (initial training, "Rescue in the Mountains" badges), although the quality of this training can, to put it mildly, vary. In tourism (hiking, skiing, and mountaineering), the situation is more heterogeneous. Now, more attention is being paid to it against the backdrop of a general increase in interest in active recreation and new legislative initiatives. In some circles, this has become a topic of even more discussion due to the wider audience coverage and less initial regulation - unlike mountaineering. Although, I confess, the over-regulation of mountaineering has always caused me bewilderment. Unlike many European countries or the USA, where mountaineering is often seen as a personal matter and the responsibility of the individual (with an emphasis on insurance and private guide schools), Russia maintains a centralized sports approach. Again, suddenly, while we envy them, many European mountaineers sometimes envy us, considering our state's approach more structured and understandable. What a weird thing.

Recently, an article appeared on the UIAA website with which I couldn't help but agree. Every time someone dies in the mountains, a wave of outrage spreads across social media: people who are not in the know post for the umpteenth time a photo of the "green boot" and discuss how inhumane climbers are for not removing another body from another eight-thousander or some extremely dangerous mountain. Please, take photos of bodies only if it is necessary for the prosecutor's office. Never post these photos publicly. I am posting the news with minimal edits.

UIAA Declaration: Human Dignity and Respect for the Dead

Discovering a body is likely to be disturbing. We must respond to this with sensitivity and common sense. The UIAA Declaration on Hiking, Climbing and Mountaineering, published in 2024, sets out the generally accepted norms of behavior that the UIAA considers optimal. This includes the ethics and style of ascents, as well as environmental and social aspects. The above quote is taken from the section “Balance between Risk, Success and Failure.” Due to climate change, the discovery of bodies on the upper slopes of high mountains is becoming more frequent. Documenting these finds has become easier thanks to smartphones with cameras. In some cases, documentation may be necessary and justified. However, it has also led to an increase in social media content, where videos of dead and dying people have sparked moral debate and raised questions about respect for human dignity. Posting graphic images without filtering or context is abhorrent and shows disrespect to the deceased and their loved ones. The UIAA, which represents member federations from more than 70 countries, recognizes that cultural and religious differences affect attitudes toward the bodies of the dead.