Safety Issues that are "Really Painful" for Russian Active Tourism

1) Certification of guide instructors

Essentially, a new axis of reality for active tourism is being set. As of July 2024, this has become a mandatory framework for commercial accompaniment on complex routes; the authority for certification has been given to all-Russian sports federations, there are schedules for 2025–2026, and many regions are living in "hurry to re-certify by 01.10.2026" mode.

Why is this topic hot? It changes responsibility, market, tolerances, and gives rise to a new type of generated risk - "paper competence" and "checkmarks instead of skills".

2) Avalanche literacy as a necessary base, not an elective for enthusiasts

A sore topic that has worn everyone out. Strangely, in tourism, suddenly, more attention is being paid to this than in mountaineering.

In mountaineering, avalanche training is traditionally embedded in the training system (initial training, "Rescue in the Mountains" badges), although the quality of this training can, to put it mildly, vary.

In tourism (hiking, skiing, and mountaineering), the situation is more heterogeneous. Now, more attention is being paid to it against the backdrop of a general increase in interest in active recreation and new legislative initiatives. In some circles, this has become a topic of even more discussion due to the wider audience coverage and less initial regulation - unlike mountaineering.

Although, I confess, the over-regulation of mountaineering has always caused me bewilderment. Unlike many European countries or the USA, where mountaineering is often seen as a personal matter and the responsibility of the individual (with an emphasis on insurance and private guide schools), Russia maintains a centralized sports approach. Again, suddenly, while we envy them, many European mountaineers sometimes envy us, considering our state's approach more structured and understandable. What a weird thing.

3) Communication and "when to press the red button"

This refers to the early call for external resources (rescuers) as a break in the chain of events. In Russian realities, this constantly rests on shame, maybe, fear of shame, and the myth (imposed by society, by the way) that "you can't bother rescuers".

However, this is also the state's fault. The state seeks to minimize the number of incidents and accidents, especially those that require costly rescue operations involving the Ministry of Emergency Situations. Regulation from Point 1 is seen as a tool for preventing tragedies, but in general, many teams have historically come to a reasonable conclusion - we all try to deal with our government agencies only when absolutely necessary.

4) Route registration, contacts, and coordinates: does it have an effect?

On the one hand, in theory, registration is not about paperwork, but about reducing uncertainty time. That is, from a theoretical point of view, everything is correct. From a practical point of view - see Point 3. Often, insurance and a coordinator solve problems much more effectively. But now, this is a subject of discussion.

In general, from my point of view, our system is simply not ready to register all groups without headaches for these groups. I won't even mention solo travelers. I personally coordinated half of my solo projects with a coordinator. This is quite effective, but it's a social crutch and the formation of a system separate from the one that should work.

5) Assembling a group through social media and the contribution of the "team factor" to accidents as the most underestimated generated risk

Assembling a group through the internet is a reality of the modern world. Nowadays, participants often meet each other only on the train, or even on the station platform before departure.

On the one hand, everything seems logical, and supporters use this: the influence of the environment on the group is reduced by increasing its resources and reducing logistics costs. On the other hand, the increase in risk generation is downplayed - analyses are not published, pre-accident situations are not made public. I understand the latter - it's a sensitive topic.

The increase in risk generation occurs due to incompatibility, different decision-making languages, and different risk thresholds. Interestingly, due to cases of individual participants backing out of assembled groups just before the trip, risks increase even more. The leader risks triggering a chain of events even before starting the route - which is, to some extent, unique.

6) Quality of physical preparation

Here, we have two extremes. The first is "why do anything at all if the hike is just walking with a backpack". The second is "I've run a lot - I'm ready".

The first is understandable. The second is interesting. There's a fantastic difference between just volume and training perception, reactions, decisions, and patterns under high load. And then, avalanches, 10-12 hour crossings, heroism on the route, and the like. Physical preparation is perceived solely through the prism of endurance, while ignoring the work of the central nervous system and inevitable energy deficit.

What's even more interesting is that high training loads are considered quite modest by sports standards. Not to mention its actual quality.

But it's good that the topic of physical fitness has also become a sore subject, as many people are really tired of its categorical insufficiency - both in tourism and mountaineering.

7) Commercial infrastructure and moral risk

When there's a guide, radio, snowcat, and evacuation is "generally possible" nearby, people's level of concern and risk generation is distorted: courage grows faster than competence. This is extremely relevant in the Caucasus and popular areas, as well as at the intersection of sports and "commercial packages". We add the problem from the previous point: the physical condition of many participants leaves much to be desired.

8) Culture of analysis: why we don't learn from others' accidents?

Here, one wants to insert a certain expletive.

We have platforms where accidents and analyses are discussed, but the culture often devolves into trigger wars rather than extracting patterns.

In my opinion, this is the most complex and poorly solvable safety problem. In industries with high safety requirements, there are two different approaches: blame culture and just culture. The first asks "who is to blame?", the second - "what broke in the system and how to prevent it from happening again?", preserving responsibility but not turning every mistake into a witch hunt. We, in our country, live according to blame culture. If you're concerned about safety, read about these two approaches and try to answer the question: why (the heck) did we take this path? It's a dead end, isn't it? But it's so convenient ))

If you can't find the answer, I'll give you a hint: at a cultural level, we are described as a people with very high "uncertainty avoidance". According to Hofstede's scale, a value of around 95 out of 100 is often cited. You can read about it, and it's really a lot. In our case, this results in a desire to have guidelines and rules for everything in the world, down to "how to correctly exit the entrance hall". Unfortunately, this same desire prevents us from switching to just culture problem-solving methods. It's only compatible with blame culture and a strong desire to punish someone, even for no reason, just in case - because the rules are the rules. It's supposed to be punitive, so someone has to be punished ))