In the second part about accidents, we dissect different groups by their route passage characteristics, resources, and ultimately by how they generate risks.

In the previous chapter, we found that the generated risks have the greatest impact on the events occurring within a group. However, different groups generate risks differently, even when the same participants in different teams can create risks in completely opposite ways.

Since we consider groups as a whole, as a single entity - simply because a group struggles with events as a unified organism - we will examine resources and risk generation primarily in relation to groups. Nevertheless, at certain stages, which we will inevitably explore using the example of ambitious participants and risk-loving participants, we will see that individual risk generation has a significant factor, especially if it involves: a) clients of commercial groups; b) group leaders.

Let's first define the division of groups based on the outcome of the route passage.

Groups by Route Passage Outcome

Regarding the route outcome, regardless of its complexity, groups are divided into: a) those that have completed the route; b) those that have dropped out of the route without an accident; c) those that have dropped out of the route with an accident. We do not consider exceptional cases that confirm the rules.

This is a very logical but "childish" division, which, however, is necessary for us to intermediate the connection between groups and risks, both inherent and generated.

So, why did the first group complete the route?

Because:

a) risk generation was minimal;

b) the group coped with the consequences of events caused by inherent risks.

That is, none of the events that occurred with the group became critical.

In this context, it makes sense to analyze what "luck" and "bad luck" mean, terms that are so loved by both enviers (if a group completes a route) and the groups themselves (if they do not complete a route).

According to our risk logic, "luck" means that the risks generated by participants did not lead to critical events (for example, climbers fell asleep while operating a gas burner in a storm tent, but one of the participants woke up in time and managed to realize that they could no longer breathe); and also when inherent risks did not cause events of great force (for example, a storm lasted two days with 8…9 баллов, rather than three days with 11 баллов).

On the same route, groups face completely different events, both generated by the risks they take and inherent risks. The dynamic system in which inherent and generated risks are combined is too complex. Therefore, the concept of luck should be used with caution or not used at all, because it can lead to the point where any successful trip can be attributed to "luck".

For example, one group managed to cross a pass, while another group encountered bad weather on the same pass. Was it luck? But the first group had backpacks that were on average five kilograms lighter, which allowed them to move at a higher speed. Was it a merit of proper tactics? No, because on the next pass, the first group encountered snow, the slope was wet, and they did not have ropes to organize belaying, so they took an alternative route. It turns out that the five-kilogram difference was caused, among other things, by the lack of climbing gear. Was it bad tactics? No, because the second group, with ropes, after passing through the snowy pass (which, in fairness, was not reflected in the descriptions), then suffered an accident in the form of brain edema at high altitude - caused, among other things, by high loads in the form of a thirty-kilogram backpack.

The concepts of "luck" and "bad luck" can be debated endlessly. These are empty words and empty concepts, always subjective and based solely on the degree of bias of the observer and participants. There are only risks, and events caused by them, which represent a fact of what happened. "Luck" is often a consequence of the chosen tactics, which turned out to be (often unexpectedly for the user) good for the current moment and conditions. And that means it only matters how the group coped with the events. Or did not cope.

A stronger group has a wider range of conditions under which it can complete a given route than a weaker group. The breadth of the range of event forces that a group can handle is the only criterion for preparation and competence that distinguishes groups on the same route. But for an external observer or a participant, this assessment is always subjective until two groups in the same location simultaneously encounter the same starting event (for example, a storm on a mountain peak). That is, they are not in absolutely identical conditions. Only the outcome of the event or events will make it clear which group is stronger in reality.

And when we compare two leaders, one with 35 years of leadership experience and the other with only 5 years, the first is likely too old to safely lead complex (and even not-so-complex) trips; and the second is still too young. However, it is far from certain that on a route of the same complexity, a group led by the five-year veteran, despite having a much shorter list of completed trips, will be weaker than a group led by a grey-haired veteran who has simply forgotten their first 10 trips, which are the most valuable for gaining experience.

Why does a group drop out of a route, even without an accident?

a) high self-generated risk

b) inability to cope with the consequences of events caused by inherent risks

Why did a group drop out of a route with an accident?

a) high self-generated risk

b) inherent risks created critical events

In this case, we are most interested in the first category: why a group completed a route. For those who did not complete it, it is clear; we examined the essence of their tragedy and failure in the form of risks in the previous chapter.

But how do "lucky" groups generate risks, and how do they cope with the consequences of events?

What is Sport in Tourism and Mountaineering?

The debate about whether tourism or mountaineering is a sport is eternal. For those who agree that it is a sport, there is also an eternal debate about who should be considered athletes.

For tourists, the solution is often simple - if you registered with the MKK (Mountaineering Qualification Commission), you're an athlete, i.e., a real tourist. For climbers, it's a bit more complicated. The idea seems tempting - are you a member of the FAR (Federation of Alpine Rescue)? Do you receive official certifications? Undoubtedly, you're an athlete. It's a seemingly fine division.

Okay. Is Dmitry Pavlenko an athlete? Is Denis Urubko an athlete?

Let's dig a bit deeper into the past, but briefly. Amateur tourism and, even more so, amateur mountaineering (initially as a single entity) emerged on their own in the USSR. Referring to the origins of tourism and mountaineering in the Russian Empire is, to put it mildly, not relevant - Soviet organizations can be their successors only for those very distant from history with a well-developed imagination. Therefore, in the USSR, these were amateur circles that gradually transformed into clubs. In the 1930s, for understandable reasons, these associations did not remain without state attention.

Amateur tourism was then placed under the supervision of the Committee for Physical Culture and Sports (Sports Committee), which called this direction of active recreation a sport and introduced the title "Master of Sports." At the suggestion of the Sports Committee, tourism sections began to be organized.

In 1949, the Sports Committee included tourism in the Unified All-Union Sports Classification, which automatically and officially classified it as a sport, and on this basis, ranks and titles began to be awarded. This inclusion clearly formed the rules for route passage, the work of the MKK, the procedure for conducting competitions, and more. As the associations grew, in the 50s, federations appeared - separately for tourism and mountaineering.

If we leave aside the fact that amateur tourism as a sport was developed as a means of improving the quality of mobilization resources in case of war with NATO, then it is documented that in our country, as the successor to the Soviet Union, tourism and mountaineering are indeed sports.

After the collapse of the USSR, the federations transformed from a controlling body to a more auxiliary one, and remained so for a long time, but today they are gradually returning to their historical roots.

So, tourism and mountaineering, on paper, are indeed sports in our country. Even if it looks illogical.

Let's move on. The MKK in tourism is an external judge that determines whether a group fits within the framework of sports. Accordingly, after completion and based on the report, the judge issues a certificate - the conclusion of their judgment.

The report (trip defense) in this case is the basis for issuing a certificate and, further, assigning a rank.

That is, with full, on-paper justification and proof, we cannot consider our trip to be sports-related if we did not register with the MKK, if our trip was not approved, and if we did not defend it. This is a legacy of the system created back in the USSR.

In turn, if we separate the desired from reality, then tourism or mountaineering, in their narrow, actual meanings, are not sports - because the evaluation of results is always too subjective for sports, and the conditions for groups are too different from the conditions of sports as competition.

In a broader, modern sense, if we exclude competitiveness and the objectivity of evaluations - it is undoubtedly a sport. It's a complex question why and what remains of it, but let's assume that's how it is. We, in turn, need to define a certain part of the routes as "sports" simply because the group's work with risks is completely different from those that follow "non-sports" routes. Since this division exists and is objectively traceable, we will further separate "sports" and "non-sports" for the sake of simplicity in analysis.

That is, if we consider accidents as a consequence of risks; acknowledge that groups follow the same routes both by registering (actually sports-related on paper) and without registering (not considered sports on paper), then we are forced to formulate our definition of "sport," which would fully reflect the group's work with risks and the consequences of events caused by these risks.

The definition will be as follows:

Sport implies the mandatory presence of a rigid goal. A rigid goal is a combination of strategy, tactics, technique, and rules, subordinated to the passage of a route of a certain classified complexity with a set of certain classified and status obstacles.

Thus, in our model, a 5A complexity peak, being included in the catalog of classified routes, has a complexity of 5A for any climber who ascends it. Regardless of whether they receive a rank and fanfare for it, or criticism from Risk and FAR.

And then a ski route regulated according to points for obstacles of 5 category remains a 5-category ski route for any group that passes it. Regardless of whether the group registered with the MKK.

The categorization of trips and peaks is not as categorical as the length of a jump in the corresponding sport, but it is still categorical. And if someone claims to have completed a pedestrian "five" in Crimea, it looks like saying they jumped five meters in a long jump when they actually jumped two.

Accordingly, if a route has a rigid goal - to pass a classified peak strictly according to established rules or to complete a route with a specific set of obstacles according to strictly established rules - then it is a sport. If there is no such rigid goal, or the rules established by the community do not suit us, then we went for a walk and to enjoy fresh air, as well as to travel at our leisure - without the suffering that is supposed to be endured by a true sports tourist.

The number of adventures encountered on the route has no direct relation to sports. Adventures are risks. It is quite possible to complete a category 1, 2, etc. route with minimal adventures, including due to excellent planning and physical preparation. And vice versa, to go from a house to a non-category hill and freeze to death there.

As a conclusion: groups can be sports or non-sports. In our case, for the analysis of accidents, this division is based on their goals and objectives.

Now, let's analyze groups in more detail.

Sports-Commercial and Commercial Groups.

Sports groups set rigid goals for themselves to pass a certain route according to certain rules.

Non-sports groups do not set such goals.

The majority of groups in tourism are non-sports, as such participation is more accessible. These are weekend trips and various not-so-complex, albeit multi-day, trips that fall under the category of "let's go for a walk and enjoy nature."

In non-sports groups, strategy and tactics are weak or absent altogether - simply because they are not needed.

However, groups can be different.

In addition to the classic sports trip, which is undertaken, for example, by the Vestera club or any other, there are sports-commercial events.

A sports-commercial trip implies rigid goals and the passage of a route of a certain complexity. But it also implies the inclusion in the composition of initially sports groups of participants-"donors," including those whose means are used to realize the passage of the route.

This is not a rare system nowadays, and it is not new, having been invented long ago. If you read about the era of great polar expeditions of the past, you will be surprised at how many participants paid for their participation. For example, the highly respected traveler Apsley Cherry-Garrard, known for his valuable memoirs about Robert Scott's expedition, bought himself a place as a biologist in Scott's expedition for a very significant sum at the time - 1000 pounds sterling.

Since the MKK does not follow the group and does not count the legs sticking out of the tent, the "donors" are not necessarily listed among the participants. There are many schemes for using "donors" in both mountaineering and tourism, but these groups are united by the fact that one or two participants in the group pay for the rest to be on the route.

That is, the majority of the group generates risks as an amateur group, while the other part generates risks as a "client." And this generation in some cases is so different that it often adds up. We will discuss the difference in how "clients" and "non-clients" generate risks in more detail below.

The next category is purely commercial groups.

Commercial groups are those where there is one or several guides, and the core of the group consists of "clients" - those who have paid for the route.

Commercial groups are also divided into sports and non-sports.

Sports commercial groups have rigid goals. However, their primary task, including reflected in their strategy and tactics, is to make money for the organizers. Specifically, to make a profit, not just to recoup expenses. Completing a route of a certain category of complexity (or climbing a peak of a certain complexity or status, like Elbrus or Everest) is their secondary task.

In this case, a contradiction often arises between the participants and the organizers that is difficult to resolve. If the organizer perceives making money as a priority task, and achieving the goal as secondary; then for the participant, achieving the goal (reaching the peak) is a priority.

In non-sports commercial groups, rigid goals are absent, but there is still a priority task for the organizer - to make money. However, in such non-sports tours, which are initially positioned as non-sports, clients pay for the process of active recreation (and not for the goal - to climb a status peak or complete a strictly regulated category route), and contradictions between organizers and clients arise much less frequently than in commercial sports groups.

So, the key difference between commercial and sports-commercial groups lies in the presence of profit. If it is implied (but not necessarily realized - this is only clear after the trip is over), then it is a commercial group.

Commercial groups are always and in any case built on mercantilism and egoism. A person wants to recoup their expenses. Regardless of what they say, it's about what they think and do. The leader of a commercial trip is a specialist bought, sometimes for a considerable sum of money. Their perception as a leader is just a visibility, a game with certain rules. But since there is no punishment for breaking the rules, in a difficult situation, people begin to be guided by their own desires, rather than the requirements of the bought specialist.

Note - nevertheless, another situation is possible - a guide manipulates a client, using them as a donor to solve their own ambitions. Such a situation, subjectively, occurs more often in mountaineering, and less often in tourism.

From the point of view of risk generation and coping with the consequences of inherent risks, surprisingly, commercial non-sports trips are the safest when all else is equal. They make the most money, operators are well-organized (we do not consider exceptions, as they are exceptions) and have sufficient equipment for their trip. They do not set rigid, and therefore requiring high returns, goals; participants pay for the process of active recreation and fully understand this; the organizer almost does not manipulate clients' passion for risk for the sake of profit - they are already being paid.

In turn, sports-commercial groups always have a high generation of risks. Participants who have bought their place are not aligned with the core of the group, technically and physically weaker. In most cases, they perceive the trip as a purchased service. As a result, they either become a source of events themselves or drag the group down when it starts working on the consequences of events caused by risks. That is, they directly affect safety.

The most "advanced" sports-commercial groups (or individual organizers of such events) get rid of "weak" (generating excessive risks - that is, weak not necessarily physically, but weak precisely from the point of view of risk generation, "unreliable") donors or all donors in general - before a truly difficult, key complexity section. They either remove them from the route after acclimatization (in mountaineering) or send them to the nearest settlement (in tourism). Essentially, this is a form of deception, even if the conditions are agreed upon in advance - because an objective assessment of the donor's unsuitability for the route is absent, and money has been taken from the donor.

The essence of the contradiction between the donor and the group is that the core of the group is primarily focused on the result of the passage, while the donor is focused on attempting the passage. For this, they are included (pay for their participation) in a sports group. The boundary between an attempt and a targeted result is theoretically very thin, but in practice, it is very distinct. To achieve a result, you need to give your all. To try, you don't necessarily have to give your all.

In turn, purely commercial sports groups are initially focused on achieving a result. From the point of view of their participants, the result is somehow pre-paid. They are ready to generate risks for this result - often without understanding their consequences, however, the organizer and guides are categorically not ready to generate them - but they have to.

Advanced operators prioritize instilling in clients an understanding of the consequences of risks. That is, they do not immediately drag them to the peak, but first prepare them on simpler routes.

The key difference between commercial sports groups and amateur sports groups lies in the inverted scheme of risk generation - more on this will be discussed below.

Note: of course, in commercial groups, there are also those who consider an attempt, not a result, to be pre-paid. Moreover, clients are generally ready to generate risks for different reasons. However: the form of the service dictates the client's behavior. This is the psychology of sales and purchases. In commercial and sports-commercial groups, the form of the service is different, and even the same client behaves differently in them.

Solo

Let's reiterate a fact from the section on sports and non-sports: with full, on-paper justification and proof, we cannot consider our trip to be sports-related if we did not register with the MKK, if our trip was not approved, and if we did not defend it.

That is, solo trips, by default, according to this logic, cannot be considered athletes and attribute themselves to sports.

This is a legacy of the system created back in the USSR. There were two reasons for this. The first was ideological. The second was related to mobilization and an element of military training. Safety was not considered - this is an illusion.

Today, our mentality includes a rejection of individualism not only at the level of competition (as in most Western countries) but also a condemnation of individualism in general, at the level of mentality. This makes us incredibly inflexible and fragile systems.

Sport itself generates individualism. Sport is a race with oneself and a fight with someone like you. There are team sports, and there are non-team sports. Tourism and mountaineering were artificially introduced into the category of "sport" in the USSR, and their rules, as sports, were initially tailored to a team, although these same routes assumed passage by forces and smaller teams.

What do we have now, in the end?

First, we have retained a good school of tourism and mountaineering in team form from Soviet times. A school of solo passages has not been formed. That is, we are not really able to go solo - there is little experience.

Second, solo trips are strongly condemned among us. This condemnation is ярко expressed in mountaineering, as the influence of the federation is stronger than in tourism. In tourism, the situation is simpler, especially now. If earlier I received a wave of letters with outrage about the "promotion" of solo trips, now they come less frequently, and on third-party resources, hatred is also subjectively less expressed towards solo tourists. Which, again, cannot be said about mountaineering.

A standard quote from the Internet regarding solo tourists (verbatim): "Solists always cover themselves with high ideals - nobody interferes, freedom, one with nature, and all that) AND NEVER admits that they have a (I)reprehensible character".

If we equate "freedom" in a trip with "rest" in a trip, implying a lack of rigid goals, then there is no difference between a non-sports group and a non-sports solo trip. Both go on a trip to rest. Including to rest from people, which can be important. If there are rigid goals, there is also no difference between a sports group and a sports solo trip. A sports solo trip is an ascetic, a minimalist, and a fanatic (sometimes - a leopard, like the author of the article). Solo, in this case, is a drawn and invented framework for themselves for passing a route or ascent, that is, artificial and conscious limitations.

Most solo routes are non-category, even if we abstract from registration with the MKK. Even long and in harsh conditions, they are more often related to non-category travels, as they do not fit into the framework of the set of obstacles and points for category routes. The main reasons for this non-categorization: a) it's not interesting to go purely sports; b) lack of technical and physical preparation for purely sports routes.

However, we are now basing our analysis of risks on the definition of sport as an activity that implies a mandatory presence of a rigid goal. A rigid goal is a combination of strategy, tactics, technique, and rules, subordinated to the passage of a route of a certain classified complexity with a set of certain classified and status obstacles.

According to this definition, solo can be both sports and non-sports.

Of course, some regions may be impassable for solo travelers - inherent risks are too high. For example, avalanche danger and passage of crevasses on glaciers are critical for solo travelers, although such routes are still attempted.

If a solo traveler considers their trips to be sports, they go on them either because of ambition or love of risk (within the framework of increasing each subsequent stake), or both. As for character, I fear the author of the above-mentioned quote is right - the higher the level of the route for a solo traveler, the more likely they are a sociopath (in a broad, not strictly "medical" sense of the word).

Expeditions

Expeditions can be divided into sports, sports-commercial, and scientific-research (true) expeditions.

A sports expedition has rigid goals. They can be characterized as solving a complex and non-trivial comprehensive sports task, unique in its kind at a given moment in time.

In essence, a sports expedition is a complex organization and expensive event, with external funding. And, in meaning, it represents a kind of earnings (monetary or reputational), the size of which directly depends on the amount of information noise produced.

After the sunset of the era of polar discoveries and the first high-altitude ascents, sports expeditions can only be called expeditions from a marketing point of view, and nothing else.

Such expeditions are not truly significant for society, and their PR represents information noise. Well, for the organizer, it tickles their ego.

Sports-commercial expeditions are also complex organizations and expensive events, with external funding.

Their differences from sports expeditions are as follows:

·       External funding includes, among other things, the inclusion of commercial participants (clients) in the expedition.

·       A certain profit is implied (for example, excess of income over expenses) for the organizers.

·       There is a prospect of using the results to make money from clients on the same route in the future.

Sports and sports-commercial expeditions are the same trips and ascents, just with a more grandiose name. Risk generation occurs on the same principles as for regular trips. However, such expeditions emphasize the ambitions of organizers and participants, which is reflected in the patterns of risk generation (which will be discussed below).

Scientific-research amateur expeditions also have rigid goals. These include performing a certain volume of work to obtain the maximum amount of information, as well as compiling descriptions of routes and obstacles, various objects on the terrain.

A true, scientific-research expedition differs from a marketing one in its consequences:

·       The result for society is distributed on a free or almost free basis (books, for example).

·       The result is valuable - maps, diagrams, detailed descriptions, logbooks, analysis of sources based on discovered objects, historical value, and the like.

These expeditions have nothing in common with geological surveys, inventory of minerals, and the like - since all of the above have unlimited resources. It is precisely this that distinguishes them from amateur trips and expeditions, as well as from expeditions of the era of polar discoveries, where resources were and are strictly limited.

The absolute majority of modern sports and sports-commercial expeditions do not carry value for society and are called expeditions due to marketing or an outdated approach, when a complex organized ascent was called an expedition.

Speleological expeditions stand apart, representing a step-by-step study and survey of caves, often over decades. These are sports expeditions in the full sense of the word. And, undoubtedly, they are true expeditions.

Group Resources

Resources are: human (the more people in the team, the more resources - they allow more work to be done per unit of time); material (food; fuel; equipment for overcoming obstacles; other equipment); and psychological. Psychological resources are a broad category that includes the psychological climate of the group, its collective nervous energy, and external support, if organized - you can look into this in more detail in Naomi Uemura's book "One Against the North".

Resources are necessary: a) to maintain performance; b) to overcome obstacles; c) to cope with events caused by risks. "Comfort" can be included in any of the listed points.

Resources are a consequence of planning and preparation. In coping with events, resources play an extremely important role. Resources run out - the participant or the entire group is finished.

When a group encounters an event of a prolonged nature, or a loop of events, its life and reactions can be compared to the Belousov-Zhabotinsky chemical reaction. We have a flask (tent or group) with reactants (resources) loaded into it, and we get a self-sustaining reaction to events. But the more time passes and the stronger the reaction, the faster the resources are depleted. As soon as resources become insufficient to maintain the reaction, the system stops working. Everyone in the group dies, or part of it.

The material resources of a group are the weight that needs to be carried. To carry it, it's desirable to have more participants. But then the weight increases again. Therefore, there is always an optimal number of participants relative to the weight. At the same time, material resources can always be attempted to be distributed along the route before passing through it.

Most sports trips and walking trips in general are built on a linear-autonomous scheme. What you take with you is what you have, and there is no replenishment of resources.

Complex trips, however, can be characterized by the organization of drop-offs. A drop-off is either dropped off by transport in advance or the group organizes a loop on the route. The definition of a sports trip regulates the rules according to which ring sections of the route are built - so that the group does not make it too easy for itself and does not turn sports into non-sports.

Since tourism as a sport was built on ideological and military preferences, its attitude towards resources is painful. In other words, if it's a sport, then plan carefully what to take, and don't create a stockpile.

Drop-offs greatly facilitate life on the route, as they allow taking many more resources and carrying less of them.

In this regard, base and intermediate camps in mountaineering are considered normal. In contrast, in tourism, going into settlements to replenish resources is considered bad form, and a lowering coefficient is applied to the complexity score. Because with settlements nearby, you can, in theory, go on indefinitely, as material and psychological resources are significantly replenished.

And, finally, there are groups with full external support - more on them below.

Equipping the Route and Group with Resources

Even the same routes can be passed differently, despite the fact that the assessed complexity does not change.

For example, the most classic variant is when a group independently provides itself and the route with resources from start to finish. That is, it sets up perils on the peak itself, organizes drop-offs, and passes all sections of the route on its own - except for coping with events when it makes sense and is possible to join forces with a neighboring group.

Another variant involves attracting external resources on individual sections. For example, hiring a partner for a solo traveler to pass crevasses; transporting equipment to a technical section by sherpas or pack transport, setting up perils by "technical personnel," trail breaking, cooking food, and so on. This also includes the not-so-rare case of plundering others' caches and drop-offs.

The higher the level of ascent or travel, the more external resources can be attracted.

This approach allows for a significant reduction in generated risks and greater focus on coping with the consequences of inherent risks. How much of this remains "sports" is a debatable question. Therefore, in most cases, schemes with the attraction of external resources are not advertised, and the more marketing is involved in the presentation of such an event, the more the focus is on the fact of the result and those who ascended or passed. The process is hushed.

A particular and interesting variant of attracting external resources is a "group-tow."

A "group-tow" ascends or travels in parallel with a more experienced and well-prepared group.

Such a group:

·       Expends less effort - navigates faster, treads less, copies tactics and techniques.

·       Inherent risks are slightly lower.

·       Generated risks can be both lower and higher, but due to psychology (this is a less experienced group, and it's easier for them), they usually generate more.

·       In case of an accident, the more experienced group is usually an external resource for them. More precisely, the "group-tow" counts on them as an external resource (consciously or unconsciously).

The situation is exacerbated if the "group-tow" is sports-commercial, that is, there are donors or a donor who has paid for their presence.

The situation is even more exacerbated if the experienced group is also sports-commercial.

Because risks love addition.

Why is it so important to know and distinguish between the emphases on supply? Because ambitions are connected with risks. That is, we can consider the silencing and tricks with supply from two sides. Through the prism of the personal qualities of the climber or tourist, which has no relation to the topic of accidents; and through the prism of risk generation.

Ambitions are about achieving a goal. A peak or a cool route, followed by recognition, big or small. But achieving a goal is only important when there is then a possibility to broadcast the picture of achievement to others. That is, for a conditionally ambitious person, the result is important.

Important: at a high level of sports ambitions, a huge share of factors reducing the real danger of the passed route can be hushed or simply remain beyond the frame.

In non-commercial trips, ambitious people usually (but not always) generate fewer risks than non-ambitious ones.

The opposite of ambitious people, who go for the result, are those who go for the process. For example, I go for the process. The result is secondary.

In non-commercial trips, those who go for the process always generate more risks than ambitious ones. And the higher the level of the athlete, the higher the risk generation. They simply get bored with the planned movement according to a structured and verified plan; they lack thrill, and they create it.

Let's imagine a 10 cm long ruler. Its middle is the 5 cm mark. At this point, the participant is minimally ambitious and minimally thrill-seeking. It's not entirely clear why they went on a trip in the first place, but such people exist. They just get caught up in a bad company or a club sect by chance. For company, so to speak. With equal result, such people can end up anywhere. Wherever it happens, they stay - in prison, in government, in church, on the street, or in a ski club.

The closer the participant moves towards the 0 mark, the more ambitious they become. The closer to the 10 mark, the more they enjoy risk.

Let's bend the ruler so that its ends are close to each other. If the ruler doesn't break, we'll find that in some cases, a participant can be both very ambitious and very fond of risk. However, the ruler often breaks, and therefore such a combination occurs rarely, and even more rarely does its bearer survive to the laurels of their achievements.

Ambitions and enjoyment of risk can be both polar factors and combined. That is, one can hush up enormous external work to reduce the danger of the passed route (high ambitions) and simultaneously generate a mass of risks, for example, for the speed of route passage (enjoyment of risk). All other things being equal, in the absence of extreme love for risk and in the presence of high ambitions, risk generation is minimal (the object or objects want to use the result of the passage); in the absence of high ambitions and in the presence of extreme love for risk, risk generation is maximal, as the result does not matter, and the process does. Thus, when ambitions prevail, the result is more important; when love for risk prevails, the process is more important.

In general, an abstract maximum level of sports ambitions does not imply a complete rejection of linear-autonomous schemes by default, but implies a rejection of them in most cases. Otherwise, achieving a quick result in the form of satisfying ambitions is simply impossible. As a consequence, the higher the ambitions, the more there can be untold stories and fabrications (and in the case of high achievements - and lies) about one's passed route.

There is also a connection with commercial groups, as an example of realizing ambitions at the expense of paying for services for their realization. There is a huge difference between an independent ascent of a complex peak or as part of a group with an experienced instructor who has drawn up a preparation plan and organized everything. But since for an external, inexperienced observer, there is no difference - they see only the result (the person climbed the peak), an ambitious client pays for this result.

For an external observer, sports trips, commercial trips, trips with external support, and all others look the same. This is where the marketing of status commercial ascents and many "high achievement" events is built. To seem and to be are different things, but they look the same from the outside.

It is precisely in this that the cardinal difference between most commercial groups and sports groups lies. An ambitious client is ready to generate any risks to achieve a result (they have pre-paid for it as a service) - and they are ready to raise the stakes. A risk-loving client has pre-paid for the process and enjoys it regardless of the result - they either have enough inherent risks or generate their own. That is, in a commercial group, an ambitious client is ready to generate more risks than a risk-loving client. While in non-commercial groups, it's exactly the opposite: a holder of sports ambitions is not ready to generate the same risks as a risk-lover - unless they are simultaneously a risk-lover, which is a rare combination.

That is, until an event begins, for a guide, the main headache comes from a risk-lover, because they crave thrill. And when an event has started or is about to start, a risk-lover has already gotten what they wanted (the trip is already going excitingly, and that's all they need), while an ambitious client starts waving their sword - they haven't reached the goal yet, and they have nothing to show their friends (and they paid for it).

Again, this is an answer to why commercial groups have more severe accidents on ascents. Rules, such as turning back due to weather or time, are very easily broken because at some point they are perceived as an obstacle to satisfying ambitions - achieving a result.

Subjectively, in commercial sports groups, there are usually more ambitious participants than risk-lovers - hence the peculiarity of how accidents occur.

However, in the context of alpine camps, the same psychological scheme related to "cage mountaineering" is realized. Obtaining the next rank at a camp is perceived by a "cage mountaineer" as a pre-paid result, and the camp itself as a purchased service. A "cage mountaineer" in this case is similar to an ambitious client who is ready to generate arbitrarily large risks. Because if they don't climb the peak, they won't get the rank. The difference between such an alpine camp and a commercial group is theoretically in the organization of the process, rigidly subordinated to rules. However, in practice