Types of Risks and Their Characteristics

For each type of human activity, a specific definition of risk can be derived. This definition also depends on the angle from which the risk is studied.

In our case, for alpinism and tourism, the risks we will consider represent a condition that, if it occurs, has the potential to negatively impact the group.

The difference here from more "classical" schemes is that we do not consider theoretical models but rather rely on practical ones. Thus, we take as an axiom that conditions capable of having a negative impact arise inevitably and on a constant basis. Firstly, many of them we create consciously and purposefully by setting certain frameworks and rules for navigating the route. Secondly, we are not capable of excluding all negative conditions because some of them arise independently of us. Thirdly, we almost never consider risks as conditions that can also have a positive impact on the group, as our research starts from accident rates rather than from accident-free conditions.

In simple terms, our risks are "before something happens." When we work with risks as uncertain conditions, the event has not yet occurred. It is potential and will happen only with a certain degree of probability, high or low. Nevertheless, since we are considering the scheme of risks from a practical perspective, the probability itself in a mathematical sense is not of interest to us because it is not important. We suffer equally from an event that occurred with a "probability of 100%" and one with a "probability of 1%," if the impact of these events is the same.

So, below we will structurally examine the risks that represent uncertain conditions capable of having a negative impact.

Important: The global safety task can be expressed in reducing the negative impact of events on the group to a subjectively safe level. But it cannot be expressed as a task of eliminating risks and events. Since risk represents an uncertain condition, it is impossible to eliminate it, and attempting to do so turns into a fiction of safety. This happens because, due to uncertainty, we are a priori unable to predict the force of the event created by the risk; and we also do not always have the ability to predict the event itself (we prepare for one event, but another occurs).

Risks are inherent (of an objective order) and generated (of a subjective order). Both categories have their rules, laws, and consequences.

Inherent risks are those created as conditions independently of us. They are divided into atmospheric risks, related to weather, and risks of a structural order, related to terrain.

For example, prolonged rains during a hike or a snowstorm during an ascent represent events generated by the atmospheric category of risks. And a rock falling on our heads while passing a pass is an event arising from risks of a structural order.

We can definitely "predict" such events due to their inherent nature. I put "predict" in quotes because we don't actually predict them; we simply acknowledge a certain probability of their occurrence. We roughly—or clearly, based on previous experience—understand the possible consequences and thus prepare for them in advance. For instance, we acquire weather-resistant tents and wear helmets.

However, we are unable to predict in advance the exact time of occurrence of an event born from risks, nor its impact force, which makes us vulnerable when trying to exclude events altogether.

A feature of inherent risks is that they tend to compound.

For example, if it rains, rocks and grass become slippery, and the water level in rivers rises sharply. If there is a heavy snowfall, avalanches occur. Strong winds or significant temperature drops cause rockfalls. That is, atmospheric risks and risks of a structural order are always interconnected, and the higher we are in the mountains and the more serious the obstacle, the stronger the impact on us from events formed by the compounding of risks.

Since the safety task of a group is expressed in reducing the negative impact of risks, when events generated by inherent risks occur, it is necessary to avoid the impact of their sum.

For example, avoid passing obstacles in difficult weather conditions or at inappropriate times of day; apply methods for assessing the state of the snow cover; use insurance on slippery slopes.

In many ways, the tactics of passing route sections are a collection of techniques aimed, among other things, at dissociating risks.

Generated risks, in turn, arise exclusively from us—both personally and as a group as a whole.

From us—this means from our personal qualities and our behavior, both in total over the hike and at specific points in time.

Generated risks involve: strategic planning of the hike; physical condition; psychological stability and state (collectively—psychological climate); previous experience; flexibility and adaptability of the group, its ability to extrapolate existing experience to emerging problems.

In other words, generated risks are consequences of the group's behavior and preparation.

Generated risks have two patterns:

a) Generated risks tend to compound;

b) The more people in a group generating risks, the higher the probability of an event; and the higher the probability of interaction between generated risks and inherent risks.

Risks can form events for a group both individually and by compounding. Almost always, when events generated by inherent risks impact a group, they are significantly exacerbated by already generated risks. That is, risks inherently tend to compound.

A team with fewer members, all else being equal, generates fewer risks than a larger team. However, it also has fewer resources to deal with the consequences of risks. Nevertheless, after exceeding a certain threshold of team size, the cumulative generation of risks outweighs the benefits of resources. This is the basis for all recommendations from MKK and FAR regarding the minimum and maximum group size—both for hikes of a certain category of complexity and for ascents (passing technical obstacles).

There is a popular misconception that a small group of 2-3 participants or solo travelers generate more risks due to the inability to carry the necessary weight of equipment and the need to spend more time performing routine actions. However, this is not the case; it is simply possible to select such equipment and tactics for navigating the route that the generation of risks will be exactly the same as for a "full-fledged group." Specific cases arise for solo travelers, mainly where it is necessary to move in a rope team. Another issue is that solo or small groups may not have enough resources in the form of team members to deal with the consequences of risks—but not material support. Therefore, experienced solo travelers and small groups on complex routes work very carefully and meticulously with risks. And that is why MKK does not officially release them, as they cannot assess their ability to work with risks while taking responsibility for such a release. The question of whether the number of solo and small groups is reduced by the refusal to register remains debatable.

In principle, the application to MKK should reduce overall risks since MKK acts as a judge, impartially assessing the complexity of the route, the group's readiness for the route, and providing advisory assistance in developing tactics and strategy—which is most important for reducing the level of risks. Approximately the same scheme applies to FAR. Ranks and titles in this case are certain non-mandatory bonuses that encourage registration. However, this cause-and-effect relationship was somehow reversed, possibly still in the USSR. This issue became particularly acute with FAR, which is drifting from being an auxiliary institution for alpinism to a controlling status. MKK, in turn, is gradually transitioning to the status of organizations for issuing certificates of route completion, which generally does not have a positive impact on risks. Nevertheless, the work of both, in posting information on reports, passes, peaks, areas, maps, accidents, etc. on the Internet, has a positive impact because it allows for the independent development of strategy and tactics, even without outside help. In fairness, however, it should be noted that the most valuable information is not posted by them but by clubs or individual enthusiasts.

Inherent risks are the main distinguishing feature of life on a hike compared to urban life. In the city, the absolute number of risks is generated. But since there are many people around, the number of generated risks is also much larger (they compound), but their consequences are usually much smaller—because there are special state institutions (hospitals, police, EMERCOM, etc.) to reduce them. In the mountains, there are few people, and risks, with rare exceptions, are generated directly by the group. But the consequences of events generated by such risks cause greater damage.

Where Inherent Risks End and Generated Risks Begin

There is a very thin line in this question, which blurs, and even in the same situation, different points of view arise.

Consider a situation where we need to climb a complex pass and hang ropes.

From the point of view of classical risk assessments, the safest pass is one that is asphalted and has a slope not exceeding 10 percent. Everything steeper already possesses inherent risks to some extent.

Of course, this is a hyperbolic example. However, the essence is that we must consider risks according to the type of activity we are engaged in.

In our case, we go on a hike specifically to climb this pass on the route, with ropes and backpacks.

When we climb dry rock in good weather, and the terrain allows for reliable points to be set, inherent risks in our case are absent. Monolithic rock is absolute in its reliability. Its slope does not matter. Even if it is a complete vertical. Only the complexity of the pass increases.

For example, if a novice who has gone on a hike for the first time in their life and immediately climbed a 3B pass as a leader to hang ropes falls and dies on such a pass (dry rock in good weather, and the terrain allows for reliable points to be set)—then this is entirely a generated risk. In this case, the fall occurred due to incorrect strategy, tactics, technique, insufficient experience, and physical preparation. The relief itself did not contribute to the climber's fall.

That is, when the environment around us is static and does not tend to suddenly come into motion (snowfall, ice, rocks; icy rocks; "living" terrain, etc.)—then overcoming it depends entirely on the participant's capabilities.

This division is also ambiguous. For example, if a ski tourist falls through the ice when crossing a lake, what kind of risks are these consequences of?

The answer lies in the prerequisites.

If we fall through the ice suddenly, following our usual pace of movement, then an inherent risk has taken effect. We investigated the ice before stepping onto it and deemed it thick and safe; we are not aware from descriptions that there is a danger of falling through here. Based on the facts, we confidently recognized the ice as safe.

If, however, it was clear in advance (visible thinning of the ice, distinct sound of water, bending young ice underfoot, visible polynya, etc.) that there was a possibility of falling through, then a generated risk is involved. The more distinct the frames of possibility of falling through, the more we generate risk—since we do not make decisions or are forced to make decisions about changing the movement tactics or discussing an action plan on the spot.

And yet: if in some accident cases there is a clear connection only between generated risk and the accident, then in another part, without a detailed study of the timing preceding the event, it is impossible to clearly determine where the prerequisites for the accident arose.

But it is also true that there are events associated exclusively with inherent risks in the complete absence of generated risks.

An outside observer, as well as a group participant, can overestimate the role of inherent risks in an accident and underestimate generated risks—in particular, to justify their own or someone else's actions; or vice versa, underestimate the role of inherent risks—simply because they really want to blame someone.

Events

Risks give rise to events. An event is a direct negative impact on the group. That is, a storm is an event. When it tears a tent, a subsequent event occurs, arising from the first. The death of one of the participants due to hypothermia in a torn tent is another event.

Thus, an event represents a fact. A fact is not true or false. It simply exists. A fact is an absolute objectivity.

An event can represent a single completed negative impact on a group. For example, in dry, clear weather, a rock flew onto a pass and injured a participant. Or it can consist of a chain of impacts when a group was descending a pass in bad weather, they had no ropes, they did not know how to perform rescue operations, and when trying to evacuate the injured from the slope, two more were injured.

The actions of the group, community, and society after an event, or during it if it lasts a long time (such as a snowstorm)—are called a reaction to the event.

Reactions to events are divided into levels.

·       Level 1: Reaction directly from the team on the route.

·       Level 2: Reaction from EMERCOM rescuers or base camp, other groups, area administration.

·       Level 3: Reaction from MKK, court, and prosecutor's office.

·       Level 4: Reaction from the media, community as a whole, and resources like Risk.ru in particular.

Despite the fact that an event represents a fact, at levels 2, 3, and 4, the event can easily be denied by external observers. And not just external observers, if we are talking about level 2, and if the event puts them in an unfavorable light. For example, EMERCOM will never admit to gross errors if they occur and lead to the death or injury of a participant in an emergency group.

We will examine the levels of reactions to events, their interconnections, and the positive and negative consequences of such interconnections in detail in the following chapters.

For a group, events are divided into critical and non-critical.

Non-critical events are when the group can cope with the event without an emergency. Most events that affect us on a hike are non-critical. We cope with them, albeit with varying effort, but they do not lead to emergencies. That is, often we create difficulties for ourselves and then heroically and successfully overcome them.

Critical events, in turn, are characterized by serious consequences for the group:

·       Withdrawal from the route.

·       Withdrawal from the route and death of a participant.

·       Withdrawal from the route and death of several participants.

·       Death of the group as a whole.

A key factor describing the difference between critical and non-critical events is the group's passage of the route. In specific cases, passing the route is possible even after the death of one of the participants.

A group's withdrawal from the route is not necessarily caused by an emergency. For example, it can be caused by weather conditions as an impact of inherent risk. However, in this case, it means that the group was unable to cope with the event due to certain reasons. Poor planning, for example.

The group's exit via an alternative route, pre-planned in advance, in the absence of death and injury to participants, is not considered a withdrawal from the route in our sense when considering risk management. An emergency exit, also known as an alternative exit, is already a worked-out part of the route as a means of dealing with events and is an integral part of the route. A group that has worked out alternative exits from the route and used them to reduce risk generation assesses the situation soberly based on certain events (bad weather and falling behind schedule, for example) and makes a correct strategic decision if they reach the exit point without an emergency—which becomes clear only upon arrival at the exit point.

Important: Until an event ends on its own or until one of the participants is injured or dies, neither the group nor an external observer can determine whether the given event was critical or non-critical for them.

An external observer's (level 4 reaction) problem is that they often try to understand the final outcome without knowing the timing, when the events have already ended and the exact outcome is known to them. This is called hindsight. In this case, the observer is not interested in the process itself because they are guided solely by the final outcome. Some level 3 reactions occur in the same way, based on hindsight, which leads to conflict with external observers who focus on timing and uncertainty. The problem lies in the attempt to find a magic bullet against emergencies among those oriented towards hindsight. That is, to come up with a rule, including a punishment rule, which, when applied (taking the magic bullet), will cut off the negative branch of event development. However, focusing solely on the final outcome with this mindset forces the ignoring of potentially dangerous branches of events that can occur due to the magic bullet. Such an external observer claims (numerous comments on Risk.ru and even some statements from commissions) that this does not matter because it is unknown whether these negative events will occur, but it is certain that a specific one will not. In this case, the observer contradicts themselves because they consider events on a hike with an emergency to be strictly determined and purely uncertain in the reality they are trying to create with the magic bullet. This is a very strange property, to which even those who consider themselves "very experienced" are subject. Perhaps this is even evidence of the assumption that experience does not necessarily imply the ability to think by default.

Important: Rules and recommendations must be strictly meaningful and not carry the character of a magic bullet. Otherwise, they lead to even greater risk generation or still do not remove uncertainty, while their compliance drains energy—forcing risk generation.

It is very interesting, however, that recommendations from commissions investigating accidents are rarely followed by participants on hikes in practice. This is a subjective opinion based on observing the overall picture of interaction between commissions and participants from the side.

The reasons lie in the following:

·       Commissions have become self-sufficient—the reaction of participants is not needed. That is, there has been a natural evolution of commissions if assessed from the perspective of Cyril Parkinson's work.

·       Commissions must issue recommendations because they see this as their goal—including for accidents where recommendations are not required.

·       Recommendations are based on hindsight, and as soon as a group falls under the action of an event, the recommendations become meaningless.

·       Commissions have long lost their authority, and few pay attention to them.

·       Recommendations based on readiness for the consequences of potential events have long been written, and there is nothing to change in them. And recommendations based on new possibilities (insurance, satellite communication, route administration, etc.) were derived by clubs themselves without the participation of commissions, which much later began to consider this in their recommendations.

The value of commissions investigating accidents, in essence, lies in: a) sublimating the circumstances of the accident and presenting them to the community (which they do not like to do—because they are self-sufficient); b) changing the complexity of local obstacles and making adjustments to recommendations for their passage (which they do not like to do—because such work implies responsibility).

Groups of Events by Possibility of Their Forecast

Let's return from commissions back to risks and events.

In events that are initially caused by inherent risks, two groups are distinguished by the possibility of their forecast.

First group: Event is predictable but inevitable.

For example, we are standing on the saddle of a pass and observing a storm front approaching us. An experienced hiker can even determine approximately when this front will reach the group.

In this case, the storm is absolutely predictable, sometimes even to within a quarter of an hour. But it is inevitable. Even if we start waving mats and shouting at the cloud, it will not stop it. And we cannot escape from it either. Our success in dealing with the consequences of the storm event will depend on how we meet it—in tents or without them.

This group of events has an important property: we cannot predict the force of these events. The storm we see can be of any strength, but we will not know this until it hits us.

Second group: Event is unpredictable and inevitable.

For example, we know that the passes on our upcoming path are rockfall-prone (rockfall is inevitable) or avalanche-prone (if there is a snowfall, avalanches are inevitable; or avalanches are inevitable in general, as on many routes in high-altitude mountaineering). But we cannot predict the time of rockfall or avalanche, nor the force with which rockfall or avalanche will impact us.

The longer and more complex our route, the greater the probability of randomness (a rock will not fly past), as well as the probability that the risks we generate will compound with inherent risks and test our skills.

A simple example is the fall of a rock on a pass. The inevitability of rockfall is based on empirical observation: something is always falling in the mountains. We cannot stop rocks from falling on a pass—that is, exclude this variant of impact on our group entirely and completely (note—in the comments, people constantly write that this is possible, but in practice, no one has seen such wizards). However, we can: a) organize preventive measures to reduce the likelihood of such an event impacting us—for example, pass the pass early in the morning, move along a certain line; b) organize preventive measures to reduce the consequences of such an event impacting us—for example, use helmets, rope insurance, and practice rescue operations on mountain terrain before the hike.

An example of inevitable and unpredictable complex events is a complex of events. For example, we are in the center of a mountain range where a heavy snowfall has just occurred. Avalanches are inevitable. But we cannot predict: a) how soon the slopes will become objectively safe; b) how truly safe, in mathematical terms, is the slope we are about to climb or descend.

Theoretically, avalanche danger is always monitored, but we are now talking about events. A feature of tourist hikes and high-altitude ascents is that we do not have the opportunity to sit still and wait until the area becomes objectively safe if we are already there and need to continue moving. Because food and fuel have a tendency to run out, and cannibalism is viewed with disapproval in our society.

Snow transfer by wind and wind speeds create very different conditions for avalanches on different exposures. We can safely enter a pass but not safely descend from it, simply because we lack the ability to assess this safety.

In practical terms, there is always a complex contradiction: assessing a route as dangerous is almost always objective; assessing a route as safe is almost always subjective.

This happens because to recognize a route as dangerous, a group relies on several markers forming a clear assessment. That is, the conclusion is based on an analysis of available facts. When there are no markers (or the group cannot see or read them for various reasons), the route is perceived as safe.

Important: Recognizing a route as dangerous does not exclude the group's movement along it. But recognizing a route as dangerous includes concern about danger in the equation, which the group uses to change tactics if it has the necessary equipment and resources. In turn, this does not mean that the group will ultimately be able to pass the dangerous route without an emergency.

In essence, all events formed by inherent risks fit into the canvas of described events: a) predictable and inevitable; b) unpredictable and inevitable.

As a consequence: events are inevitable. But some of them we can predict. In turn, even if we cannot predict events, we can predict the consequences of events and work with them.

An example is avalanche detectors in a skiing group going through the mountains. In most cases, we cannot predict an avalanche event, but we can fight its consequences. Similarly, with a piece of rope for crossing rivers in summer.

Patterns of Influence of Inherent and Generated Risks on Accidents

Let's now examine the patterns that exist in the distribution of the influence of inherent and generated risks on the probability of an accident.

The theses of the distribution are as follows:

1. In a certain average expression, the higher the complexity of the hike, the more experienced the group participating in it. And the lower the influence of generated risks on accidents, with a simultaneous growth of inherent risks.

This is an interesting point. The danger of a hike increases with its complexity—so the impact on the group from the dynamic environment also grows. With increasing complexity, rockfalls and avalanches occur more frequently on the group, and with increasing duration, there is a fundamental increase in the number of adventures—due to mathematics. Because the longer we look for adventures, the more we find them. This life logic cannot be avoided because a hike essentially involves searching for adventures by navigating a route.

At the same time, an experienced group, through natural and/or targeted selection of participants and leaders, generates fewer risks than an inexperienced or uncoordinated group.

Studying accidents shows that almost all accidents related only to inherent risks, without the participation of generated risks, occur on hikes of high complexity and with experienced groups.

The same study of accidents (based on open but limited sources) shows that the share of such cases in complex hikes can probably reach up to half of all cases. The remaining accidents are consequences of either purely generated risks or the compounding of generated and inherent risks.

2. In principle, about half of all accidents on routes occur solely due to generated risks without the participation of inherent risks. The exact share is impossible to calculate, but the pattern is clearly traceable. Accidents in this category are not related to weather or terrain impact—only to the behavior of group participants and hike planning.

This is also an interesting point. It turns out that we pose the greatest danger to ourselves.

3. In the compounding of inherent and generated risks, in 100% of cases, generated risks play a decisive role. When studying events and reactions to events, this is very clearly and always traceable.

That is, despite the fact that a feature of a hike is a large number of inherent risks, it is only we ourselves and our preparation that matter. This thesis correlates with the first thesis, which describes experienced groups.

Total risks уступают в своей доле в авариях сгенерированным рискам, but not by much.

Hence an important conclusion: Hiking is not dangerous because of the wild nature and harsh conditions. It is dangerous because we are not skilled and not capable.

In this regard, solo and small-group hikes and ascents can be assessed from another angle. If the contribution to accidents from generated risks is so significant, then the small size of a group, in general, does not play a role in the occurrence of emergencies. Technically, it plays a role only at the stage of reaction to events when many resources are needed.

Generated Risks

Let's talk about generated risks in more detail.

Generated risks are divided into consciously generated and unconsciously generated risks.

Conscious generation of risks does not imply that a participant or the group as a whole understands and accepts the consequences of this generation. It implies that participants or the group are aware of the existence of recommendations or rules but for some reason deviate from them.

The key characteristic of consciously generated risks is as follows: The event caused by generated risks is considered unlikely by the group or participant.

That is, the probability of events is not denied but is not taken into account. Or if it is taken into account, it is considered either acceptable or so unlikely that there is no need to prepare for it.

I will give three examples, from simple to complex.

1. A group does not bring helmets on a hike, or if they do, they use them limitedly because "it's more convenient without them." This example is characterized by many myths and prejudices about helmets, despite the fact that rockfall, as we have already considered above, belongs to the category of Inevitable Unpredictable Events. That is, rocks always fall if the terrain implies the possibility of them falling.

The most severe misconception about helmets is among inexperienced solo travelers and small groups. On relatively simple passes of 1A-1B, they sincerely believe that rocks do not fall on their own but only if they are helped. Although, it would seem, the rocks lying below should suggest other thoughts. Steep scree or movement along "living" moraines is not taken into account at all.

2. In ski hikes, the vast majority of tourists do not take avalanche beacons with them, despite the fact that emergencies occur constantly. In this case, the cost of the device is not an excuse because, until recently, for several years, they were quite affordable. Some Arva Evo 4 cost not much more than a Splav expedition backpack. Interestingly, even some alpine camps pushed avalanche detectors into the mandatory list for corresponding seasonal shifts, despite the fact that their mortality from avalanches is subjectively much lower than that of skiers (because mountaineers more often tie themselves to the terrain and to each other).

3. Many so-called professionals work on relatively complex technical obstacles without insurance, and they do so consciously. In particular, when I climb 2A with a walking backpack in my solo hikes, without any insurance, I am consciously generating risk and fully understand the fragility of my position (sometimes even deriving pleasure from it).

Why is this a complex example? And why did I say "professionals" if non-professionals do the same?

The difference is that so-called professionals generate such risks with a motive rigidly embedded in their strategy, tactics, and accompanying physical preparation. In other words, I often go without a rope because I am limited by self-imposed rules that turn the route into a sports competition. When we talk about "non-professionals," they usually have a rope with them; it is prescribed in their strategy and tactics, but they do not use it on a certain section because they consider it unnecessary—"it's inconvenient with it."

What is the difference in outcome with this accursed rope?

We have events that are Unpredictable and Inevitable. Rocks always fall. Many events generated by inherent risks are possible, and only high physical fitness and experience do not resolve them. Since rocks fall randomly, they do not care who is climbing, a master or someone who thinks they are a master.

However, if free climbing, which I took as an example of a complex case, is embedded in tactics, strategy, and physical preparation—that is, if one is truly prepared for it—then the number of generated risks is lower.

Let's express danger through an equation:

danger = risks + concern

Let's break down the risks:

danger = (inherent risks + generated risks) + concern

danger = (IR1+IR2+…IRn+GR1+GR2+…GRn) + concern

By excluding part of the generated risks from the equation and skillfully managing concern, a master is exposed to less danger.

But—danger always remains, and the improbability of an event, due to the impossibility of predicting its force, kills an uninsured master more easily than an insured novice.

As an example, one can cite the death of Ueli Steck.

As an illustration for the example, one can cite his words shortly before the ascent in which he died:

When I am on Everest, I can retreat at any moment. The risk is not great here. For me, this is primarily a matter of physical condition. Either I will retreat, or I will have enough strength for a full traverse.

How Consciously Generated Risks Are Created and Their Patterns

Consciously generated risks are caused by the following actions on the part of a participant or group:

·       Conscious negligence in technique. Technique in our case is a combination of methods for navigating a route. This includes methods for passing local obstacles (passes, peaks, etc.) and methods of working at a camp (windproof walls for tents, fires for cooking, etc.).

·       Conscious violation of safety techniques (for example, excluding helmets, crampons, rope insurance, attempting to walk with trekking poles instead of an ice axe on steep slopes, etc.).

·       Conscious negligence in the maintenance of equipment.

·       Conscious risk-taking actions for the sake of thrills.

·       Strategically important equipment taken on a hike does not have functional redundancy.

Strategically important equipment is equipment without which it will not be possible to complete the planned route or possibly even to descend from it via an emergency exit. As a rule, strategically important equipment includes tents, sleeping bags, warm clothing, and technical equipment for overcoming local obstacles.

Functional redundancy of equipment is its ability to allow us to cope with events of great force that are beyond normal expectations.

A simple example is a tent. If we are going to a region where strong winds are possible, we can take a tent that is just barely wind-resistant, comforting ourselves by thinking: a) we will look at the weather in the evening, and we won't put up the tent on top if the weather is bad; b) others have hiked with such tents, so we will manage too, and if something happens, we will hold the poles; c) it's lightweight.

This is common. I myself hiked through Khamar-Daban with an MSR Access 1, which would be quickly flattened in a storm on the peaks. But I was always lucky with the weather during overnight stays on top.

Problems with a tent rarely lead to emergencies on a route but can lead to withdrawal. A flattened tent, torn or with broken poles, is not always repairable on the spot. Moreover, a repair kit is itself strategically important equipment.

At the same time, the presence of functional redundancy in equipment does not save us if we are negligent in technique. For example, if we do not set up a windproof wall for the tent or do not pay due attention to its stretching or installation in the wind.

A more complex example of functional redundancy of equipment is crampons and an ice axe. Often, in both tourism and mountaineering, soft crampons (complete with non-rigid boots) and simple (non-technical) ice axes are used on hikes where conditions go beyond their safe application not constantly but only under certain conditions. In tourism, this is seen much more frequently, in the form where individual participants have less suitable equipment, with the logic that they will still have perils set for them.

The concept of functional redundancy is absolutely contrary to the concept of lightweight hiking and always collides with attempts to reduce weight.

In general, the main task of a group to combat such risks is the ability to identify categories of strategically important equipment for the upcoming hike and to determine the boundaries of functional redundancy for the identified categories.

Advanced commercial companies organizing ascents at high altitudes use the concept of functional redundancy widely, providing not just a list to their clients but often one detailed by specific characteristics. For example, a sleeping bag rated for -40 degrees is the norm in their lists.

The next point in conscious risk generation is:

·       The absence of a worked-out tactics for passing obstacles and an attempt to develop it directly during the passage.

Here, one cannot confuse the absence of tactics with its change along the way. However, only experienced groups can change tactics to another, good one.

The development of tactics by a group that is directly before an obstacle and is about to work on it immediately is equivalent to the absence of tactics. The more complex the obstacle, the more time is needed to develop tactics on the spot, and the more actions need to be taken.

At the same time, any group, when faced with an obstacle of objective complexity (according to the classifier), subjectively correlates it with its level. This assessment may or may not coincide with the objective complexity.

Processing sources and gathering information about the route precisely allow for: a) developing tactics and algorithms; b) reducing the time of preliminary work on the spot; c) better correlating visual assessments of obstacles with one's level.

First ascents are always rated one subcategory higher precisely because of the impossibility of building tactics in advance. Nevertheless, in tourism, there are many passes with such poor and confusing descriptions that developing tactics for their passage in advance does not bring benefits, and one has to rely on the spot. Because of this, the passage of the pass is greatly delayed in time, especially in conditions of insufficient visibility.

Returning again to risks: a separate point can be made about conscious risk generation related to survival—when any decisions are bad by default.

And yet, it is important: Conscious generation of risks does not imply that a participant or the group as a whole understands and accepts the consequences of this generation. It implies that participants or the group are aware of the existence of recommendations or rules but for some reason deviate from them.

By themselves, individually generated conscious risks seem insignificant. However, we have already considered three important points above:

1.     The force of an event is unpredictable. By the way, if someone in our group claims the opposite, this is a good reason to wonder: why do we need this prophet-charlatan?

2.     About half of all accidents on routes occur solely due to generated risks. Without the participation of inherent risks.

3.     In the compounding of inherent and generated risks, in 100% of cases, generated risks play a decisive role.

But here it is also important to understand another point: we cannot do without generated risks on a hike. If someone claims otherwise, it means they are offering a "magic bullet"—either due to very little experience, or an inability to apply it, or because they want to say something smart.

From here, we return to the thesis from the beginning of the article:

The global safety task can be expressed in reducing the negative impact of risks on the group to a subjectively safe level. But it cannot be expressed as a task of eliminating risks. Since risk represents an uncertain condition, it is impossible to eliminate it, and attempting to do so turns into a fiction of safety. This happens because, due to uncertainty, we are a priori unable to predict the force of the event created by the risk; and we also do not always have the ability to predict the event itself (we prepare for one event, but another occurs).

If we express it more simply—a group must first and foremost be able to work with the consequences of events, including assessing risks through their consequences.

Unconsciously Generated Risks

There is a very important point here:

In most cases, a person is not able to determine whether a risk is a natural result of their activity or if they are generating it independently of this activity.

Unconscious risks are generated due to:

·       Low level of experience for the general or specific situation;

·       Insufficiently flexible thinking;

·       High level of self-confidence;

·       Inability to establish relationships with other participants (the so-called psychological climate);

·       Overestimation of one's physical preparation.

Important: Unconscious risks are generated by both inexperienced tourists and experienced athletes.

Above, we have already seen that experienced, coordinated groups are indeed capable of distinguishing between generated and inherent risks, but the role of generated risks in the origin of events is too great.

If more briefly—an athlete of a high level generates unconscious risks simply because they are an athlete of a high level. Another question is that in many cases, they are able to cope with events generated by these risks.

But the force of an event that occurs due to the generation of unconscious risks is unpredictable. An athlete of a high level can unconsciously generate risks that can easily kill an athlete of a lower level. Therefore, having first-timers in