In the previous chapters, we examined the combination of processes that can lead to events on a route.

We found that risks are at the root of everything. Risks represent a condition that, if it occurs, has the potential to negatively impact a group.

Risks are "before the fact." When we work with risks as uncertain conditions, the event has not yet occurred. Our actions and decisions on the route are always accompanied by risks. They either generate them or, conversely, reduce the likelihood of an event by eliminating the conditions for their occurrence.

In most cases, an accident is either caused or accompanied by our actions and decisions - risks. However, our actions and decisions can also prevent an accident or reduce its severity. The nuance is that the negativity of a decision or action is only known after the fact - and often the mistake is not acknowledged; good decisions and actions, on the other hand, mostly go unnoticed because the event did not occur. This contradiction affects the further application of experience. Solely positive experience does not provide an understanding of the boundaries within which decisions and actions are most effective. Nevertheless, negative experience without recognition and analysis of mistakes leads to a similar result. In this regard, the described version of negative experience is much more dangerous than solely positive experience.

Thus, risks create conditions for events to occur. Risks come from both the team itself - generated risks, and from the environment - inherent risks.

An event is a direct negative impact on the group. That is, when a storm tears a tent, an event occurs, resulting from an environmental factor. The death of one of the participants due to hypothermia in a torn tent is another event.

A storm here represents an environmental phenomenon; it becomes an event when it transfers the system to a worse state.

Thus, an event is a fact. A fact is not true or false; it simply exists. A fact is an absolute objectivity. As a team on a route, we cannot deny a storm. The wind speed will be assessed by us, most likely subjectively, unless we have special skills or a measuring device. But a torn tent will also be a measure of the wind's strength and, undoubtedly, a fact of the event. We cannot deny that the tent was torn due to the storm. The discussion will be about our contribution, i.e., the generation of risks to this event. After all, the tent could be set up in a slightly different place (or it might not be possible due to terrain conditions), with the wind direction taken into account (including by rearranging it), properly stretched, with a wall installed, and so on.

An event can represent a single, complete negative impact on a group. For example, on a clear, dry day, a rock fell on a pass and injured a participant. Or it can consist of a chain of impacts when a group descended from a pass in bad weather, the pass was not the right one, they had no ropes, they did not know how to perform rescue operations, and when they tried to evacuate the injured from the slope, two more were injured.

The actions of the group, community, and society after an event, or during it if it lasts a long time (such as a snowstorm), are called a reaction to the event.

In turn, an event loop is a chain where the reaction to an event increases the likelihood of the next event due to the degradation of resources and the increasing cost of decisions.

Reactions to events are divided into levels.

• Level 1: the reaction of the team on the route.
• Level 2: the reaction of rescuers from the Ministry of Emergency Situations or the base camp, other groups, and the administration of the area.
• Level 3: the reaction of the MKK (Mountain Classification Commission), court, and prosecutor's office.
• Level 4: the reaction of the media, the community as a whole, and specialized resources like Risk.ru.

Levels 3 and 4 are always external observers. At level 2, most observers are also external or external relative to the main events that occurred with the group earlier. They participate in the reaction to the event but rarely work with the events themselves. Being an external resource, their task is to prevent the occurrence of the next event.

We also previously examined the resources of groups and the degree of their influence on risks in detail and pointed out that in groups of different levels of preparation and organizational schemes, risk generation occurs differently.

In this chapter, we will determine what events and event loops are.

How Events Are Categorized

Events are categorized according to:

1. Degree of discreteness.
2. Consequences of the impact on the group.
3. Duration of the impact on the group - the most important for understanding how to work with events.
4. Group's reaction to the event - no less important, but always follows from point 3.

The most severe consequences occur for a group when it itself triggers a sequence of other events after the first event and enters an "event loop," depleting its resources. Moreover, events can repeat because the group's reaction to them is uniform and template. Based on incorrect premises and making incorrect judgments, the group, in search of solutions, goes around in circles between two or three typical solutions with minor variations. Even if the events themselves do not repeat, the situation worsens with each subsequent significant period, and the sector of possible solutions narrows as resources are depleted.

If the events do not end on their own or the group does not find a way to break (disconnect) the loop, the group's resources are depleted, and it perishes unless external resources, such as rescuers or other groups, intervene.

The duration of an event's impact on a group determines, among other things, the group's reaction speed, the nature of the reaction, and the likelihood of getting into an event loop.

Examples of Event Loops

Event loops are divided by duration into:

a) short - within an hour;

b) medium - within several hours, sometimes about a day;

c) long - during which the group experiences at least one night cycle (overnight stay, equipped or emergency) and lasting more than a day.

Long and medium loops often include short micro-loops due to their duration.

Let's consider characteristic and real examples of event loops of different durations.

Example 1 (Karelia, 2009). Short (fast) loop.

The short loop here is because its key mechanism unfolds in minutes.

The materials are taken from the "Accidents in Sports Tourism" community.

A group of skiers was moving along a route, somewhat behind schedule due to navigation difficulties. In a populated area, the participants clarified with local residents the state of the ice on Lake Onega: they were told that "if the frost holds for another night, it will be possible to pass along the shore." In the morning, the group went onto the ice, which initially looked firm and slightly dusted with snow. The leader reminded them to move on the ice only on skis. The distance between people on the site was about 30 meters. The group can be characterized as experienced, having the necessary hiking skills.

Marker (early signal)

As they approached the cape, the quality of the ice noticeably deteriorated: it became thinner, started to crack, and water began to seep through in places. A participant, walking second, recorded a subjective decision "I'll reach the nearest cape and won't go further on the lake." This is an important moment: the environment has already sent a signal that the movement along the chosen path is transitioning from "usual complexity" to a mode where the cost of a mistake is high.

Event #1 (loop launch)

Shortly after, the same participant, looking up from the ice, saw the rucksack of the first participant on the ice. His owner was not visible, and it became clear that he had fallen through. The participant stopped at a distance and did not approach closer due to fear and the clear fragility of the ice.

Reaction #1 (rescue "by inertia" and event amplification)

The next participant approached the rucksack and began rescue actions, offering a ski pole to the fallen participant, who emerged from under the water. However, the ice began to break, and the polynya started to expand. The rescuer was forced to retreat from the edge and pull the pole back to the drowning person. But he, grabbing the pole and trying to get out, continued to break the ice.

Here we see an important mechanism of the loop: each attempt to get closer and help increases the destruction of the edge, worsening the conditions for both the victim and the rescuer "here and now."

Event #2 (loop accelerates)

During the rescue attempts, the second participant also falls into the water. The polynya grows, and the situation transitions from "one victim" to "several victims + thin ice around." The group loses control: some people are far away, the last one is not visible, and the nearest ones experience panic and a feeling that they will "all fall through."

Reaction #2 (involvement of new people and means: the next stage of situation deterioration)

Other participants approach. They use a short, about 1.5 meters, rope, mats, and try to organize an improvised support for those who have fallen through. The leader approaches, choosing an approach from the shore - which subjectively seems safer. But to the right of the polynya, the ice is even worse - the leader falls into the water, not reaching the edge.

Event #3 (mass accident)

An attempt to help the leader results in the fall of the participant who was walking second: the ice is literally "about a centimeter" thick, the edge crumbles, and holding on becomes impossible. At this moment, the event loop is fully revealed: rescue turns into a struggle to exit the thin ice zone.

Reaction #3 (change of goal: not to rescue, but to get out)

A new working plan emerges: "break the ice and make our way to the shore." Participants begin to move towards the shore, breaking the ice, repeatedly falling through, supporting each other vocally and physically. Against the backdrop of fatigue and icy water, the participants' condition worsens; episodes are recorded where a person stops moving and has to be kept afloat.

Loop outcome

Out of six participants who fell into the water, only one managed to reach the shore. The others froze and drowned. The participant who reached the shore was rescued by hunters after some time.

Why is this a loop and not a chain of events?

The loop here is that the reactions to the first event worsened the environment and reduced the group's resources, thereby significantly increasing the likelihood of subsequent events:

a) destruction of the ice edge and growth of the polynya: there were even fewer safe points of support;

b) approach of new people to the dangerous zone: there was an increase in the number of potential victims.

The group did not have pre-stored algorithms for action in case of falling into the water, which exacerbated the consequences.

Where could the loop have been switched off (we are not moralizing, just listing the switches)

a) at the stage of the event-marker (cracking, water, deteriorating ice): translate these signs into critical ones and retreat, abandoning movement on the ice;

b) immediately after the first fall: "freeze" the group (stop, distance, control), prohibit individual approaches to the edge without a stable scheme, and only then act.

c) after the second fall: a change of goal to mass survival and exit from the thin ice zone should happen instantly - but in fact, it happened too late, when the loop had already spun up.

Why did the loop stop?

This is an important point.

a) In relation to the group, the loop devoured the system to zero, and there was nothing left for it to spin further (no one to act, no one to make mistakes, no one to rescue). That is, the carriers of the loop were exhausted.

b) The participant who reached the shore was met by hunters - i.e., an external resource sufficient for rescue was connected. We cannot assert that she would have definitely perished. But by the time hunters saw her, she was unsuccessfully trying to start a fire (the lighter did not work), not moving anywhere, and remaining on the spot in wet clothes for some time.

Example 2 (Three-headed, 2011). Medium loop.

Events here unfold over several hours. At the same time, the loop has a long prelude and short micro-loops within it, where individual decisions are made in minutes. It turns out to be a "layered" case, quite non-linear at first glance.

Context: during an ascent to the summit of Three-headed via route 2B, organized as part of an official autumn mountaineering camp, one of the participants fell off the ridge and hung on the ropes. Attempts to help him were unsuccessful, and the participant (Sergey P.) died from hypothermia. The event loop is built based on the testimony of one of the participants - Olga K., taken from the Risk.ru resource.

The group was considered fairly experienced: an instructor, 2 participants with a second category, and 6 participants with a third category. For a route of 2B category, this is formally more than enough.

Olga K. directly writes that "We gathered almost all the mistakes: lack of training before the ascent, going out in bad weather, lack of communication in the group and with the base, incorrect tactics, etc.", and then gives a narrative from her perspective, as she saw the events. Importantly, this immediately sets the framework - we are considering not "one fatal second" but a system where mistakes accumulate and reinforce each other.

Marker (early signal that the cost of decisions is starting to rise)

Quote: "The lag behind the schedule started on the approach. Then the weather worsened. There was a proposal to turn back. They said the weather was normal, and as long as we could, we would go."

At the same time, another team heading to the same mountain turned back due to the weather.

Event #1 (launch of the group management loop)

The group (links) scatters in terms of pace: some people move ahead, some lag behind; we have to wait for the last link.

Quote: "We waited a long time. There was a serious proposal to turn back. The instructor almost agreed. Then they said 'everything seems normal, we can hear them,' the instructor sent the front four further... We waited, went further. The weather was terrible. Strong wind, blizzard, ice grains. We had to retread, visibility 3-5 meters, sometimes less. Eyes were constantly stuck with snow (I broke off ice pieces from eyelashes and eyebrows to see anything), the protective mask was frosted over."

Reaction #1 (waiting and catching up, which leads to loop amplification)

Waiting in bad conditions consumes the group's main resource - time. And time here instantly turns into cold and fatigue. The result is that the group becomes slow and less manageable, creating conditions for subsequent delays.

Resources being consumed here: time, warmth, cognitive clarity, coherence of actions.

Event #2 (deterioration of people's performance)

Against the backdrop of darkness and icing, errors and falls occur. The group slows down even more. Quote: "Waited a long time. K. appeared, said that Sergey P. was feeling bad. Following him, the rest appeared: 'Everything is normal, go up!' I went to the North... It's dark. Eyes are glued with ice, it's hard to see. Because of this, I fell, was dragged over the rocks. Participant K. was in some kind of hysteria. Participant K. was very exhausted. Participant K. and Sergey P. suggested staying on the saddle between the North and Central peaks and not going anywhere. Possibly, I acted unkindly: I shouted at them to move, we couldn't spend the night, we had to get out faster."

Reaction #2 (pushing forward despite worsening conditions and subsequent loop amplification)

A "squeeze to the next point" mode appears. On the ridge, there is a strong wind, and the group does not see the possibility of safely staying in place and must continuously move, either forward (quote: "there were only three ropes of half a length to the summit"; theoretically, the descent would then be relatively simple), or backward. All this against the backdrop of fatigue and cold.

Quote: "K. went first. He went for a long time. The instructor couldn't stand it, went after him."

This could be justified by the task of "scouting and preparing," but the loop has a price: those below remain in a worse condition (Sergey P.) and with fewer resources.

Resources being consumed: group manageability, reserve of help on the spot, psychological stability.

Event #3 (critical node: Sergey P. falls off the ridge, and those remaining have no resources)

Resources here refer to both management means (communication and equipment) and general resources (two people, tired and frozen).

Quote: "We insistently asked Sergey to remove his rucksack, he refused. After some time, there was a command 'ropes are free,' we put Sergey on the ropes, he still didn't remove his rucksack. I started to climb, attached to him by a rope. He quickly jumared about 2m, tripped, and went into a pendulum. He hung and said he couldn't go further. We tried to persuade him, shouted, asked in various ways to go up a bit more, all in vain. Then we started shouting to the top in two voices about a pulley system, so they would send down second ropes (all the ropes and equipment went up, we had nothing - otherwise we could have helped by pulling from the top). There was no response. No activity." Here: "Sergey got on the ropes around 11 PM."

Below Sergey P. on the ridge remain two people: Olga and participant M.

Reaction #3 (attempts to "get through" to the upper group by shouting and signals or to resolve the situation improvising - which in total leads to loop amplification).

When there is no communication and no equipment, there are: shouting, improvisation, waiting, and physical fading of people on the spot.

That is, the reaction itself becomes a source of the next event: time is running out, people are cooling down, and efficiency is falling.

Resources being consumed: time for rescue, people's performance.

Event #4 (loop revelation: rescue work and the long way up start to create new victims)

After an hour and a half of waiting, Olga called the rescuers. There was no news from those who went ahead. They started thinking about how to save themselves. They couldn't pull Sergey P. out on their own - there was not enough equipment, and they were already frostbitten. With great difficulty, they managed to climb past the hanging Sergey (he was still alive but not quite adequate) and climb to the summit to look for other group members. They reached the summit around 3 AM. The group was there, in a rather poor condition, although the strongest then tried again to pull out Sergey.

Here begins the zone where "saving one" starts to turn into "we need to save everyone." Fortunately, rescuers arrive (external resource).

Outcome (consequences as an indicator of the loop's cost)

Sergey P. dies. M. (Olga's partner) has severe frostbite on fingers and toes. Olga has a 1-2 degree frostbite on her face (the entire surface except the forehead), severe bronchitis, consequences of general hypothermia, and psychological trauma.

Why is this an event loop?

Because every decision to "pull further" creates conditions under which each subsequent decision becomes more expensive and worse: delays consume time, time turns into cold and fatigue. Therefore, people lose speed, coordination, and clarity, and as a result, new delays and mistakes appear. Because of this, communication and management are disrupted, and rescue work requires even more time. The loop tightens and tightens like a noose.

Where could the loop have been switched off (we are not moralizing, just listing the switches)

a) at the stage of the marker: lagging behind the schedule and a sharp deterioration in weather, as a transition to "critical" mode before entering the "expensive" zone.

b) at the stage of group disintegration: any catching up in a blizzard is an automatic increase in the cost of decisions, and therefore a rigid protocol for maintaining control and cohesion is necessary.

c) before the ropes, where "K. went first. He went for a long time. The instructor couldn't stand it, went after him." It is not possible to leave people below without real rescue means and without communication (the fact that "the radio died" and "we had nothing" is a switch).

d) when a person hung on the ropes and communication did not work: an immediate change of mode - not "persuading" but exiting the zone where the loop produces new victims (minimizing time in the wind and immobility).

How did the loop switch off in this case?

According to Olga's testimony, she got out the radio and called the rescue team at 00:30 - still at the stage when Sergey P. was hanging on the ropes, and the upper part of the group was not responding.

Further, she directly writes that she thanks them for responding quickly in such weather and successfully lowering the rest of the participants.

It is important to understand: if she had not called the rescuers - would the loop have ended at the events described above?

With high probability - it would not have ended for the group so quickly and without new victims. By the time everyone except Sergey P., who was hanging on the ropes, gathered at the summit, the loop had already switched to a mode where rescue work was starting to produce new victims. That is, time is running out, people are freezing, fatigue is growing, the ability to act is falling, and thus each subsequent decision becomes more expensive. This is directly visible in Olga's description (quote "another couple of hours - and we would be corpses," frostbitten hands, actions aimed at self-rescue).

Without an external resource, the group had a scenario of self-evacuation in a state of degradation, and there, the probability of a cascade of events in the form of "another one hung, fell, fell asleep, and didn't make it" would be substantially higher. But it cannot be asserted that they would "definitely have perished"; weather, chance, and the remaining resource could have given them a chance even without rescuers. It's just that this chance would be worse.

The call to rescuers pulled in an external resource before the group crossed the critical exhaustion threshold. That is, the call to rescuers became a key switch: it introduced an external resource and stopped the loop's tendency to produce new victims.

Example 3 (Elbrus, 2003). Long loop.

Input data

A group of 9 people was undertaking a hike corresponding to a mountain category 4 complexity. The group was assembled via the Internet; some participants had previously hiked with the group's leader. All participants met for the first time on the train. The participants formally confirmed to the hike leader the necessary experience, but the investigation commission later recognized that the overall level of experience did not correspond to the route.

The main goal of the hike was considered to be the traverse of Elbrus from west to east. An acclimatization lap and technical part were supposed to be a ring down - along the Bityuktyube and Ulluchiran glaciers. Several backup options were planned in case of a withdrawal.

Thread: Mir st. - Khotyuta plateau - middle of the SW edge - Kykkyurtly shoulder (up to 2A) - Western plateau - right icefall of Bituktyube (2A-2B) - Bituktyube glacier - Frunze pass (up to 2A) - tongue of Ulluchiran glacier - left upper icefall of Ulluchiran (up to 2A) + Western plateau + Western summit + Elbrus Saddle + Eastern summit + Achkheriyakolsky lava flow + Djikaugenkgez plateau (2B) - Chat pass (1B) - Irik river - Elbrus village.

During the hike, one of the participants died, and seven others received frostbite of 2-4 degrees. Four required hospitalization.

Brief description of events, by days and without interpretation

April 27 - May 2: slow progress in good weather, trail-breaking, minimal daily altitude gain, characterized by a low pace of movement.

May 3: decision to ascend to the Western plateau for an overnight stay, as campsites below were deemed unsafe in strong winds.

May 4-5: waiting out the weather at an altitude of 4700-4900 meters (data varies), poor health of participant V. - she has a fever, lies in a sleeping bag, and eats almost nothing. The leader, who lives in a different tent, surveys the participants regarding their well-being and receives a response from all that everything is fine.

May 6: good visibility and weather; due to falling behind schedule, the group decides to abandon the acclimatization lap and head for the traverse of the summit. No one complains about their well-being.

May 6 evening: despite the lack of trail-breaking, the group's pace of movement is extremely low. Participant V. is weak and moves very slowly; unloading does not help. The leader decides to stop for the night, as the group cannot make it over the summit due to the low pace. The overnight stay altitude is 5200 m.

May 7: sharp deterioration in weather. The group waits for a window, sitting in tents with packed rucksacks. Cold and humidity intensify, strong winds. Participant V. has diarrhea. The whole night, the weather and situation remain the same: the group sits on rucksacks due to fear that the tents will be torn by the wind.

May 8: attempt to exit during a lull, although the weather is unstable. During the gathering, the weather sharply worsens again, and two tents are already dismantled. The entire group squeezes into one tent; attempts to set up other tents fail due to weather and participants' weakness. They again try to squeeze into one tent, resulting in damage to the tent's canopy and poles. A small tent is managed to be set up, and the group waits out the weather in two tents - a small intact one and a large damaged one. There is no possibility to cook or melt snow. The group is dehydrated. Signs of severe hypothermia and exhaustion are noted.

May 9: the group's condition is poor. Participant V.'s condition is very poor: two days without food, two days of diarrhea, one day without water. A decision is made to move forward through the summit as the most reliable path. The torn tent is left behind. Participants set out individually, as they gather, starting around 11:00. Participant V. gathers very slowly and is urged on. The group stretches out. According to the leader, people were close to complete freezing. Strong wind, frost, high humidity - everything is icing up. Visibility is 10-20 meters. The group reaches the summit around 16:00 and discovers the absence of participant V. A decision is made not to wait for her but to descend to the south. By 1:30...2:00, the group reaches Priyut 11. It becomes clear that another participant, D.V., is also missing. By 4 AM, the group descends to the Bочки ( Barrels), aided by a passing snowcat.

May 10-11: the weather is good. At the Bочки, the leader reports to an MES (Ministry of Emergency Situations) employee about the two missing participants, then leads the group down to Terksol. By lunchtime, participant D.V. descends to the Bочки - having lost the group at night, he takes refuge in a crevasse and survives the night wrapped in a sleeping bag. Participant V.'s body is found on May 11, 400 m below the western ridge on an ice slope. Presumably, she fell off the rocks. A rucksack, helmet, and crampons are found on the ridge: likely, the deceased removed them, then approached the edge and fell down.

Features of the accident

The case we are examining stretches over days and experiences several night cycles. On a long distance, the loop is amplified not in one moment but by accumulation over the long term:

low pace → falling behind schedule → increase in altitude and dependence on weather → stormy fixation at altitude → loss of basic living conditions → sharp drop in performance and manageability → decisions in evacuation mode and loss of control over participants → death of a participant

An important effect: within the long loop, short micro-loops appear (minutes-hours), which sharply accelerate degradation - for example, an attempt to exit during a weather window on May 8, after which the camp was partially dismantled when the weather worsened again.

The basis for the scheme is materials from the MKK investigation and the leader's response, compiled into a single timeline. The collection of materials is taken from the "Accidents in Sports Tourism" community.

Marker (early signal)

Low pace in good weather and health issues among participants at an early stage of the route. This is a marker not of "guilt" but of "system mismatch": the pace is already consuming time, and time will later become the most expensive resource.

Event #1

Falling behind the schedule becomes significant by May 6.

Reaction #1

Abandoning the planned acclimatization lap (ring through the icefalls) to traverse Elbrus.

How the reaction amplifies the loop

A typical exchange occurs: "we save time now but lose system stability later." That is, the decision to abandon the acclimatization lap and go straight for the traverse reduces the calendar lag but decreases the buffer in the form of acclimatization and performance testing before the more stringent part of the route.

Resources being consumed: buffer of stability and options for a soft exit from the route in case of complications.

Event #2

Extremely low pace of movement. The group stretches out. Participant V. is clearly feeling unwell, and this becomes obvious.

Reaction #2

Decision to stop and set up camp at an altitude of 5200 m. Participants are redistributed among tents; participant V. is moved to the leader's tent as it is more spacious and warm.

How the reaction amplifies the loop

The overnight stay itself can be a stabilizer, but here it occurs at altitude, with unknown weather ahead. This increases dependence on weather: if it worsens, the camp will be in a point where any delay is very costly in terms of resources.

Resources being consumed: time (weather window), reserve of strength.

Event #3

On May 7, a sharp deterioration in weather: strong winds, frost, humidity. Visibility is poor. Moving between tents is extremely difficult. For participant V., the situation is exacerbated by diarrhea.

Reaction #3

The group waits for a weather window with packed rucksacks without dismantling the camp.

How the reaction amplifies the loop

On a long loop, this is a key mechanism: waiting at a high-altitude point in bad weather leads to paying with the resource "warmth, water, sleep, clarity of thought." The longer the wait, the less ability to perform any actions afterward, such as gathering or setting up camp, cooking, orientation, and, more so, movement.

Resources being consumed: warmth, water, sleep, clarity of thought, fine motor skills, psychological climate.

Micro-loop on May 8 (short within the long one)

A weather window appears, and camp gathering begins, but the weather worsens again, and two tents are already dismantled. Nine people cram into one tent, its entrance cannot be closed. Attempts to set up the gathered tents fail. Poles break, and the canopy of the standing tent tears. Cooking is impossible, so the group is dehydrated and weakened.

Explanation: at altitude and in cold, dehydration quickly grows; dehydration becomes a background accelerator of the loop.

Schematically, the short loop looks like this:

window → partial camp dismantling → deterioration → sharp drop in protection → even less ability to act → even more resource loss

At this moment, the group loses a structural resource: full-fledged shelter and the ability to cook. This translates the loop from "bad" to "irreversible."

Event #4

After the night of May 8/9, signs of severe hypothermia and exhaustion in the entire group. Drifting off, Cheyne-Stokes respiration in the leader, and almost complete cessation of activity in all participants are described.

Reaction #4

On May 9, a decision is made to move forward through the summit as the easiest, most reliable, and fastest path available. Some things are left behind; the leader's tent is abandoned as unusable.

How the reaction amplifies the loop

The group transitions to an evacuation mode typical for such cases: the decision is rational in one sense (we need to move, or the group will freeze) but occurs against the backdrop of minimal management resource. Any loss of control here turns into new losses.

Resources being consumed: control, communication, ability to gather the group together, reserve of clothing and shelters.

Event #5

The format of the exit is individual, so the group stretches out. Visibility is 10-20 m; people lose each other. On the summit, they discover the absence of participant V. They decide not to wait for her but to descend, assuming she will catch up or return to the abandoned camp.

Reaction #5

Descent of the entire group to the south towards Priyut 11 as a priority - saving the majority with deteriorating manageability. Against this backdrop, participant D.V. is lost.

How the reaction amplifies the loop

In long loops, this is a typical finale: when the management resource is already below a certain threshold, the system starts to lose participants even on relatively simple sections, as connection, control, and mutual assistance are not maintained.

Where could the loop have been switched off (we are not moralizing, just listing the switches)

a) Early pace marker from April 27 to May 2, when the pace was already critically low in good weather. This is a window for re-marking the route plan towards simplification before high-altitude fixation.

b) After the first weather wait and against the backdrop of participant V.'s poor condition. The materials directly reflect the commission's opinion that an emergency descent along the ascent path was necessary.

c) On May 8: not bringing the situation to a partially dismantled camp with unstable weather - this is the point where the short micro-loop sharply amplified the long one, as there was a loss of two tents as a resource, plus a significant loss of strength.

d) The format of the exit on May 9: choosing an individual pace in conditions of poor visibility and overall system weakness sharply reduced control and increased the likelihood of losing participants - which happened: first participant V., then participant D.V. This is noted as an erroneous decision post-factum by the leader himself.

Counterpoint to Example 3. Local micro-loop break (participant D.V.)

On the descent to Priyut 11, the system is already below the sustainability threshold: the group is stretched out, visual contact is lost, voice communication does not work, intervals between participants are large, and visibility and darkness make any small mistake potentially fatal.

Against this backdrop, participant D.V. has a technically banal episode: he loses a crampon. While he is adjusting it, he loses sight of the group; no one responds to his cry. In the twilight, he cannot confidently find the start of the descent trail and decides not to continue moving blindly but to wait out the night, taking shelter in a crevasse and wrapping himself in a sleeping bag. In the morning, with improved weather, he descends to the Bочки on his own.

From the model's perspective, this is a break in a local micro-loop. At the moment of losing contact with the group, a typical contour is launched:

stop → attempt to catch up in poor visibility → increase in divergence with the group → growth of uncertainty → orientation errors, falls, or complete loss of route → even fewer resources → even worse decisions

D.V.'s decision actually breaks this contour: he stops increasing uncertainty by moving, switches the situation from "generating risks" to "conserving resources" (warmth, clarity, remaining strength), and waits for an external change in the environment that will make movement manageable again. The combination of two conditions worked: 1) he had a minimal resource to survive the night (sleeping bag); 2) the environment provided a weather window in the morning.

It is important: this episode does not fix the group's large loop - it only shows that against the backdrop of management collapse, an individual participant can sometimes break their micro-loop at the cost of refusing to move. But the very fact that the participant remained alone on the slope at night and was not heard is an indicator that the large loop has already transitioned to a phase where the system starts to lose people: control over the composition, cohesion, and ability for instant mutual assistance became insufficient.

Technical Explanation for Example 3 Context

Dehydration and energy deficit (hypoglycemia) worsen not only strength or endurance but also cognitive control: attention, risk assessment, and the ability to perform simple sequences of actions.

In this phase, a person can appear strangely adequate for a short time and inadequate the next minute - that's how physiology works in such a state.

Therefore, in a long loop, saving a person often means first preserving their brain, i.e., their "thinking ability": providing water, warmth, carbohydrates, and removing them from exposure.

Dehydration and hypoglycemia are not a separate event but an amplifier: they reduce the quality of reaction at all levels.

*This is not a universal explanation for tragedies, as not everything is explained by sugar and water. But it is one of the important factors that, in conditions of altitude and cold, quickly turns a manageable